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Personal Voice Assistants (PVAs) such as the Amazon Echo are com-
monplace and it is now likely to always be in range of at least one
PVA. Although the devices are very helpful they are also continu-
ously monitoring conversations. When a PVA detects a wake word,
the immediately following conversation is recorded and transported
to a cloud system for further analysis. In this paper we investigate
an active protection mechanism against PVAs: reactive jamming.
A Protection Jamming Device (PJD) is employed to observe con-
versations. Upon detection of a PVA wake word the PJD emits an
acoustic jamming signal. The PJD must detect the wake word faster
than the PVA such that the jamming signal still prevents wake
word detection by the PVA. The paper presents an evaluation of the
effectiveness of different jamming signals. We quantify the impact
of jamming signal and wake word overlap on jamming success.
Furthermore, we quantify the jamming false positive rate in depen-
dence of the overlap. Our evaluation shows that a 100% jamming
success can be achieved with an overlap of at least 60% with a negli-
gible false positive rate. Thus, reactive jamming of PVAs is feasible
without creating a system perceived as a noise nuisance.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Personal Voice Assistants (PVAs) are deployed as stand alone de-
vices such as Amazon Echo or Google Home, are integrated within
every phone, tablet and PC (Siri, Cortana), are used in appliances
such as TVs and set-top boxes (LG, SKYQ) and are integrated into
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cars (Mercedes). Thus, it is very likely that we are always at least
in range of one PVA.
Using microphones, PVAs are monitoring the acoustic channel
for a specific spoken word. Once this wake word has been detected
the PVA records the immediately following audio signal which is
then transported to a back-end system for further analysis. The
back-end system then analyses the audio signal and extracts spoken
user commands.
Out of security and privacy concerns, people would like to be in
control of surrounding PVAs, for example, to disable the ability to
issue commands or to prevent recording of conversations. When a
person is in control of the PVA she can simply turn off the device.
However, in environment such as public spaces this is impossible.
In this paperwe investigate acoustic reactive jamming as amethod
of disabling PVAs. A Protection JammingDevice (PJD) is usedwhich
emits an acoustic jamming signal to prevent a PVA from analyz-
ing audio signals. However, instead of continuously jamming the
channel, which would be perceived as continuous noise nuisance,
jamming is applied reactively at specific moments. Specifically, the
PJD recognizes the spoken wake word and applies a jamming signal
to it. Thus, the PVA fails to recognize the wake word and it does
not record the following audio signal.
The PJD will also be useful for other protection scenarios which
are beyond the scope of this paper. For example, recent work has
shown that PVA can be triggered by attackers using inaudible voice
commands (see Zhang et al. [25]) which could be recognized and
jammed. Our focus is on designing a protection device, empowering
people to control PVAs tapping into their conversations. It also has
to be noted that the described mechanism can be exploited by a
nefarious actor to disable a PVA.
Signal jamming has been previously employed as effective pro-
tection mechanism. For example, reactive jamming has been used
to protect wireless communication networks [2, 14]. The packet
header containing source and destination addresses is evaluated
and, if required, a jamming signal is applied to the remainder of
the packet, preventing packet reception. Our work transfers this
reactive jamming method to the acoustic domain. A recent work
by Roy et al. [17] demonstrates inaudible jamming in the acoustic
domain. Non-linearity of the microphone shifts the white noise
jamming signal in the ultrasound frequency range to the audible
range. This work shows how to jam an acoustic system without
people noticing the signal directly. However, this existing work
is not tailored to the PVA context and uses continuous jamming
signals which are inefficient and also might constitute a potential
health risk. To the best of our knowledge, the work presented in this
paper is the first investigating reactive jamming targeting PVAs.
Reactive jamming requires two elements: wake word detection
and jamming. The protection device must be able to detect the wake
word faster than the PVA. The protection device can then apply the
jamming signal to the later section of the wake word. If the overlap
is sufficient, wake word detection by the PVA is prevented. The
jamming signal must be effective and people should not consider
it as noise nuisance. Thus, the signal should only be applied when
needed (low false positive rate), be not too loud and somewhat
pleasant to listen to.
This paper provides two specific contributions. First, we quantify
the impact of jamming signal and wake word overlap on the jam-
ming success. We use four different wake words used by the popular
PVA Amazon Echo and four different jamming signals for our study.
Our evaluation shows that PVA wake words can be jammed with
a 100% success rate in most cases when jamming signal (Additive
White Gaussian Noise (AWGN)) and wake word overlap more than
60%. Second, We quantify the jamming false positive rate in de-
pendence of the required overlap. The protection device has to
recognize the keyword faster than the PVA leading to false posi-
tives; jamming is applied when not required. Our evaluation here
shows that false positive rates are negligible.
2 PERSONAL VOICE ASSISTANTS
Many companies nowadays have their own signature Personal
Voice Assistant (PVA) software and hardware. For instance, Apple
appliances integrate Siri, Amazon provides Alexa, Google integrates
the Google voice assistant, and Samsung gadgets work with Bixby.
2.1 System Overview
There are two operation phases of a PVA: activation phase and
recognition phase. In the activation phase, a user needs to activate
the PVA to initiate speech recognition. Typically, a user presses a
specific button (e.g. as used on a SKYQ remote) or simply says a
wake word (e.g. Alexa in case of Amazon’s Echo). Most systems
implement a wake word as this improves usability. The wake words
may be speaker-dependent (e.g. Hey Siri) or speaker-independent
(e.g. Alexa) [25]. Wake word recognition is continuously active on
PVA devices. Once the key word is detected, the PVA enters the
recognition phase. For most systems the audio signal following the
wake word is streamed to a back-end cloud service for analysis.
The cloud service is used to analyze the captured audio signal to
extract user commands. It also may store captured audio signals.
Central part of a PVA device is the wake word recognition imple-
mentation. Cooperations such as Apple or Microsoft do not provide
details of their implementations; however, open source toolkits
such as AlexaPi based on PocketSphinx developed by CMU [5] are
available. All major wake word recognition implementations have
similar performance from users’ perception and are based on only
several major approach options.
Speech Recognition (SR) is employed for wake word detection
in the activation phase on the device and as well for command
recognition on the back-end during the recognition phase. SR for
wake word recognition can be less complex compared to the one
used in the back-end as only one or a few words must be recognized.
Wake word recognition is a specific application of SR referred to
as Keyword Spotting (KWS) in the literature. Often, wake word
recognition is implemented in dedicated hardware to improve en-
ergy consumption of battery powered devices. Wake words can be
speaker-dependent and in this case the legitimate user has to train
the PVA.
2.2 Speech Recognition and Keyword Spotting
The process of SR begins with separation of the audio input based
on pauses. Each identified speech block is called an utterance which
may be a word or a non-linguistic sound (e.g. cough, um, breath) [4].
Each utterance is then split into segments. A feature vector is ex-
tracted to represent each unit.
Models need to be constructed to predict what language elements
these units represent. Gaussian Mixture Models (GMMs) are the
commonly used acoustic models. However, recently these have been
replaced by models trained by Deep Neural Network (DNN) as they
are more robust. These models can tolerate better environmental
and hardware specific variations [9, 13, 15].
Further processing is necessary to deal with temporal variabil-
ity [9]. Hidden Markov Models (HMM) are normally applied to
Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR) and KWS. Some recent KWS
solutions can also work without HMM [3, 13].
Other techniques using Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs)
or Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs)/Long Short-Term Memorys
(LSTMs) instead of the combination of DNN and HMM for KWS
also exist [13].
Apart from these techniques, some KWS systems use Large Vo-
cabulary Continuous Speech Recognition Systems (LVCSR) to de-
code audio and generate lattices [3, 13], then they can be used for
indexing and keyword searching. These systems focus on large au-
dio database applications rather than audio streaming applications,
which is outside the scope of this paper.
2.3 PocketSphinx
AlexaPi based on PocketSphinx performs wake word recognition
using the GMM-HMM approach for KWS described earlier [10].
PocketSphinx [10] is the optimized version of CMU’s SPHINX (an
open source LVCSR system) for resource limited embedded systems.
PocketSphinx provideswakeword selection and detection threshold
tuning functions.
Products such as Amazon Echo/Echo Dot or Google Home use
proprietary algorithms (often in combination with specialist hard-
ware) based on more recent techniques discussed in the previous
section to perform KWS. For example, Amazon products mainly
use DNN-HMM solutions, Google and other vendors use solutions
such as a single DNN followed by a posterior handling method.
Although PocketSphinx doesn’t apply state-of-the-art model-
ing technique, it is still a reliable KWS solution [7, 11]. Because
it is an open source speech recognition system it is often used in-
stead of proprietary speech recognition toolkits. In particular, small
companies or independent developers make use of PocketSphinx.
In our evaluation we use AlexaPi based on PocketSphinx, which
means at this stage we only focus on jamming wake word recogni-
tion based on GMM-HMM. We treat the wake word recognition as
a black box, meaning that our jamming signals are not designed to
the specifics of the wake word recognition algorithm.
Figure 1: Wake word jamming framework. (1) The wake word is re-
ceived by PVA and PJD. (2) The PJD detects the wake word faster
than the PVA and applies jamming. (3) The PVA fails to recognise
the wake word. (4) The PVA does not record the voice command.
2.4 Security Considerations
It is probable that the voice data sent to the back-end and also
extracted commands are stored. Companies such as Amazon and
Google can use the data in many ways. The command history
extracted from audio streams can be used for marketing purposes
(learning user behavior). The audio streams can be used as training
data for the SR system. Companies are not very clear in regards to
how captured data is processed and used. A user must therefore
assume that recorded audio streams or results from processing
these remain in the back-end system.
Users might trigger the PVA unintentionally by using the wake
word (e.g. by talking about your friend Alexa). In this case a conver-
sation that is not a command to the PVA is recorded. Users might
want to be in control, and ensure that wake word recognition is
disabled. If users are not device owners this is difficult to achieve
(e.g. in public spaces with PVA systems). Wake word jamming as
described in this paper can help in such situation.
Another threat is from adversaries who are familiar with the
working mechanism of PVA and are skilled at producing human un-
noticeable or human inaudible sound attacks. Some research [18, 25]
has shown how to send human inaudible but machine understand-
able voice commands to attack PVAs. Our work in this paper sheds
light on how to protect against such covert attacks.
An attacker might also use the jamming technique we explore
in this paper to prevent the use of PVA systems. A jamming device
using a human inaudible reactive jamming signal will be very hard
to detect and will prevent the use of any PVA in the vicinity. An
attacker might further use jamming to hijack the system. The at-
tacker can prevent the PVA to execute user commands and instead
perform an action. The user has the impression of interacting with
the system while another device is acting on its behalf.
3 PERSONAL VOICE ASSISTANT JAMMING
It is our aim to design a reactive jamming framework which can be
used to intentionally disable PVAs. We aim to interrupt the wake
word detection in the activation phase so that the PVAnever reaches
the recognition phase. Jamming is applied selectively, preventing
continuous jamming signals that can be perceived as noise nuisance
or even have health implications. The jamming framework can be
instantiated to become a Protection Jamming Device (PJD).
3.1 Jamming Approach
The overall design of the jamming approach is shown in Figure 1:
(1) PVA and PJD are continuously observing the acoustic chan-
nel. Both devices listen to the channel and try to determine
if the wake word is spoken.
(2) The PJD is set to detect the wake word earlier than the PVA
by only looking for the first part of it. Upon detection, the
PJD applies the jamming signal.
(3) The jamming signal now overlaps with the remainder of the
wake word currently still analyzed by the PVA. The jamming
signal prevents recognition of the wake word by the PVA.
(4) The following voice command is not recorded by the PVA as
it does not transition from activation to recognition phase.
The outlined approach is possible as the PJD is set to detect
the wake word much faster than the PVA. Thus, enough time is
available for the PJD to apply an effective jamming signal. The time
duration in which jamming signal coincides with the later part of
the wake word is referred to as overlap.
3.2 Design Challenges
A PVA’s wake word recognition is designed to be very accurate to
prevent accidental triggering. We exploit this fact for the design
of the PJD and deliberately sacrifice accuracy for detection speed.
The PJD is set to react to the start of the wake word and triggers
jamming when there is a match. Obviously, the PJD will be less
accurate in wake word recognition than the PVA and false jamming
will be the result. It is the aim to jam as effective as possible which
means that the overlap should be maximized. However, the overlap
should be minimized to prevent unnecessary jamming. An overlap
should be found that balances these optimization goals.
Reliable jamming requires a jamming signal that interferes with
recognition of the target signal as much as possible. Intuitively,
the jamming signal should be as strong as possible and it should
also overlap with the target signal as much as possible. However,
the design of the interfering signal is also important. The signal
should be not perceived as noise nuisance and, thus, the most
effective jamming signals might not be usable. Furthermore, the
signal shape could be tailored to the SR algorithms employed. This
approach might result in a very effective jamming signal but will
only be effective for the specific SR system. Finally, the jamming
signal could take the signal shape of the keyword into account to
effectively jam its specific properties.
3.3 Jamming Evaluation Framework
In our evaluation, described in the next sections, we explore and
evaluate the aforementioned design space. We use the following
evaluation framework.
We used an open source software called AlexaPi [1] running on a
Raspberry Pi 3 Model B. The AlexaPi uses an open source SR system
called Pocketsphinx developed by CMU [5] to detect wake words.
The system uses the Amazon cloud service as back-end system
for following speech analysis. The system is similar to commercial
Amazon products such as the Amazon Echo; the difference is the
implementation of the wake word recognition. The Raspberry Pi
together with the AlexaPi and Amazon cloud service is the PVA
system used in our experiment.
















(b) Alexa with AWGN
Figure 2: The audio signal of the wake wordAlexawithout and with
20% overlap of the AWGN jamming signal.
As we aim to evaluate systematically jamming performance
we create the audio input signal for the PVA system artificially.
This input signal contains the wake word and, with a set overlap,
the jamming signal. The generated combination of wake word
and jamming signal is directly fed into the AlexaPi via a virtual
microphone input. By bypassing speakers, microphones and other
system elements we can study accurately the impact of jamming
signal, overlap and Signal-to-noise Ratio (SNR) without system
related influences.
The wake word voice for the audio input signal is generated
using the open source Text to Speech (TTS) software Festival [6].
This method provides us with a standardized signal that can be re-
produced1. The wake word is then mixed with the chosen jamming
signal using Matlab.
4 JAMMING EVALUATION
We aim to quantify the impact of jamming signal and wake word
overlap on the jamming success. We evaluate the effectiveness of
audible jamming signals first; thereafter we investigate the practi-
cality of inaudible jamming. Wake word variants, noise signal types,
SNR and overlap are the four parameters varied in the experiments.
We use the wake words Alexa, Amazon, Echo and Computer
because these are wake word options for Amazon Echo products.
In the first set of experiments, we chose AWGN, a Ding, and a
short audio recording of ambient noise in a Cafe as noise signals
(Audible Jamming). AWGN is known to have good interference
properties while it is not a pleasant noise for users; the Ding and
Cafe noise is less intrusive but has potentially less jamming capabil-
ities. SNR levels of 10dB, 0dB, -10dB and -20dB are used. An overlap
from 0% to 60% is selected.
In the second set of experiments, we use inaudible jamming
signals. An AWGN signal is created and then a high pass filter is
used to filter out components below 20kHz. In practice, the signal
is still audible as perfect filtering is not achievable (The signal is
limited in the time domain). When the SNR is 10dB, 0dB and -10dB,
the signal is barely noticeable. However, when the SNR reaches
-20dB, the noise is obvious. Thus, a second noise signal with a band
pass between 22kHz and 24kHz is used which is less audible as it
has less frequency leakage in the lower frequency range. Again, an
overlap from 0% to 60% is selected.






















(a) Alexa - White Noise






















(b) Alexa - Cafe Noise






















(c) Alexa - Ding Noise






















(d) Amazon - White Noise






















(e) Computer - White Noise






















(f) Echo - White Noise
Figure 3: Average jamming success rates when using audible jam-
ming signals. The AWGN (White Noise) is the most successful jam-
ming signal. The required jamming overlap is wake word depen-
dent. An overlap ofmore than 60% achieves a 100% jamming success
for all wake words.
4.1 Audible Jamming
Alexa is used as wake word. The audio signal in time domain is
shown in Figure 2a which also depicts the range for each syllable in
the wake word. Figure 2b shows the same audio signal with added
AWGN noise overlapping 20%.
Figure 3a shows the result of jamming Alexa with AWGN. The
x-axis represents the overlap; how much of the signal was jammed,
counting from the end of the wake word. The y-axis indicates the
jamming success rate. For each SNR a different curve is included.
Each data point is created by executing the experiment 10 times.
Figure 3a shows, as one would intuitively expect, that a larger
overlap results in a better jamming success. Also, as expected, the
strongest jamming signal with an SNR of -20dB is the most effective
(with 40% overlap this signal can jam with a success rate of 75%).
However, when reaching a 50% overlap there is no consistent cor-
relation between SNR and jamming success. For example, the 10dB
signal can jam successfully with an overlap of 50% while signals
with an SNR of 0dB and -10dB are less successful (53% and 30%).
We suspect that this behavior is due to the specific structure of the
wake word; the k sound in Alexa is similar to the interference sig-
nal used for jamming which sits at 50%. When the jamming length
reaches 60%, jamming with all four SNR levels is 100% successful.
Results of jamming Alexa with a Cafe noise is shown in Figure 3b.
As the jamming length increases, jamming success rate is negli-
gible for SNR of 10dB and 0dB. For SNR of -10dB and -20dB, the
1The exception was the word Computer for which we used a human voice recording;
the software was unable to synthesize the correct pronunciation of the C.












































Figure 4: Average jamming success rates when using inaudible jam-
ming signals. Inaudible jamming of wake words is feasible.
jamming rate is higher. Results of jamming Alexa with Ding noise
(see Figure 3c) has similar results except higher jamming success
rate for 0dB SNR.
From these experiments it is clear the AWGN is the best jamming
signal. It is also shown that with an overlap of more than 60%,
jamming is 100% successful, even when using a very quiet jamming
signal of only 10dB.
AWGN is used to jam the different wake words Amazon, Com-
puter and Echo. The results are depicted in Figure 3d, Figure 3e and
Figure 3f. A noise with an SNR of 10dB can jam reliably the Amazon
wake word with an overlap of more than 60%. However, once the
SNR is less than 10dB, jamming is effective with an overlap of 20%
or more. The wake word Computer requires an overlap of more
than 60% for reliable jamming. Echo can be jammed with an overlap
of 40%, with the exception of an SNR of 10dB where a jamming
success of only 50% is achieved.
This evaluation shows that the required overlap is dependent on
the wake word. However, it is also shown that an overlap of 60%
is sufficient in most cases which gives a PJD enough time to apply
the jamming signal.
4.2 Inaudible Jamming
Using the wake word Alexa the effectiveness of the two inaudible
jamming signals is investigated. The results of this experiment are
shown in Figure 4a and Figure 4b.
With the 20kHz-24kHz jamming signal and an SNR of -20dB and
an overlap above 50% reliable jamming is achieved. With the 22kHz-
24kHz signal reliable jamming is achieved with a 50% overlap. The
result here is interesting as it is possible to jam the system with a
noise signal that exists outside the spectrum that voice occupies.
To this end we can only speculate why this approach is possible;
we offer three explanations: (i) The wake word recognition algo-
rithm extracts features from the spectrum; the inaudible frequency
range below 24kHz may be included. (ii) The frequency leakage in
the audible frequency range is sufficient to affect the recognition
process. (iii) The PocketSphinx integrates a software Automatic
Gain Control (AGC) and the low frequency voice signal is reduced
as the gain is adjusted to the high frequency noise.
The experiments show that there is potential to develop a jam-
ming approach that makes use of jamming signals that are inaudible
to humans and are therefore non intrusive.
5 FALSE POSITIVE JAMMING EVALUATION
The PJD may trigger unnecessary jamming as it must recognize the
keyword before the PVA. With the time window available to the
Wake Word Searched Letters Frequency (%) Overlap












Table 1: Frequency of the words that start with pronunciation sim-
ilar to the keywords. The spoken word data is taken from British
National Corpus 2014 [12]
.
PJD, words with similar beginning to the wake word may trigger
jamming. These false positive jamming events are not desirable as
they introduce unnecessary noise nuisance.
We investigate the false positive jamming attempts by looking
at the frequencies of words in a spoken word corpus that start
with a pronunciation similar to the wake words. We use the British
National Corpus 2014 [12] consisting of 11,422,617words.We search
for the words that start with similar pronunciation to the wake
words. For example, we consider the words starting with ale for the
keyword Alexa. It should be noted that some words starting with
ale may not be pronounced similar to Alexa (for example, the word
ale itself). Thus, the results represent a worst-case analysis.
Table 1 shows the results. If we consider ale*, 0.0014% of com-
monly spoken words are similar to Alexa. The overlap for jamming
in this case is 52%. If the PJD uses ale* as trigger, the last 52% of
the wake word can be jammed and we would expect a false pos-
itive jamming for 0.0014% of spoken words. The overlap here is
according to syllables boundaries and an analysis of overlap values
of exactly 50% or 60% is not sensible.
We believe that false positive rates are acceptable for a practical
jamming device, especially if the jamming signal is in the inaudible
frequency space.
6 RELATEDWORK
Jamming is a well studied subject in the communication domain.
Existing jamming work focus either on disruption of communi-
cations [16, 21, 24] or implementation of novel protection mecha-
nisms [19].
Reactive jamming has been used to protect wireless commu-
nication networks [2, 8, 14, 19, 20, 22, 23]. The packet header is
evaluated and, if required, a jamming signal is applied to the re-
mainder of the packet, preventing reception. Our work is similar
but we apply this concept to acoustic signals.
There are few work aiming at jamming-based protection in the
acoustic domain. Roy et al. use inaudible jamming against eaves-
dropping [17]. Although it is not reactive jamming, we can make
use of the reported approach to inaudible jamming.
7 CONCLUSION
Our work shows that reactive jamming of PVAs wake words is
a feasible approach. The approach can be used for protection, to
control when PVAs can function. However, the mechanism could
also be exploited by an attacker to block PVA services.
We have demonstrated that modestly strong audio signals with
10dB SNR and an overlap of 60% (with AWGN) can block wake
word detection with a 100% success rate in most cases. This means
that the PJD has at least 40% of the wake word duration to make
a jamming decision. We have shown that this may lead to a false
jamming; however, the false jamming rate is very small and should
be acceptable for most practical scenarios. We have also shown
that it is feasible to move the jamming signal into the inaudible
frequency range, making it more applicable.
Our next steps are to carry out an evaluation with off-the-shelf
PVAs and to supply audio and jamming signals via speakers instead
of directly supplying generated audio signals to the PVA. We also
plan to improve the design of inaudible jamming signals and to
construct a practical PJD.
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